Without Fidel Castro





Orderly transition to Raul Castro with FAR and Party support

FAR becomes an active power broker. Factionalism rises over who will succeed Raul Castro and economic and political reform

Political and military overtures for improved relations with US. Playing the anti-US card if rebuffed

Orderly transition to collective leadership without Raul Castro

FAR in control. Factional conflicts intensify on leadership and policies

Military leaders could split on policy towards US

Civil War. Conflict between organized FAR units

Military leadership splits over ideological, political, or regional issues. Personal and special interests outweigh institutional interests

US residents drawn into conflict as combatants and suppliers. Other countries become involved. Pressures for US government to intervene

Imposition of a government by external forces.

Military would forcefully resist as guerrilla groups

Intense pressure for US to intervene. Externally imposed government would require extensive US military support







I.                    Raul Castro, probably following prescribed constitutional norms, would succeed Fidel Castro as dictator of Cuba. Lacking all possible qualities to rule the country, he would be critically-dependent on the support of the FAR and would also need the support of the Party leaders and the rising technocratic class to maintain control of power. He would have to create a framework for collective leadership. This would require making sure key military leaders fully supported all policy initiatives. The impact on the FAR of orderly transition to Raul Castro would likely be for the military institution, the ultimate power broker in Cuba, to assume the role of active, day-to-day power broker.


II.                 A government that took power through an orderly transition by displacing Raul Castro would be dominated by the FAR. The FAR commanders would           be ruling the country either directly or indirectly. Non-military elements           would also play a political role, and the titular head of the government might be a civilian or retired military officer.


III.               Military leaders are unable to settle their disputes peacefully and Cuba is afflicted with a civil war in the form of prolonged combat between organized units of the FAR. Warfare could be triggered by a contest for political power or by personal, corporate, or regional differences regarding democratic openings or economic and foreign policy.


IV.              A government dominated by the Cuban exile community is imposed by force. Some Far units might resist with guerrilla forces, very unlikely. Some FAR officers might cooperate with this government; others might choose retirement or emigration.










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