What is nuclear power?

Nuclear power taps the ultimate source of energy which powers the universe and its myriads of stars like our Sun. Nuclear engineers deliberately arrange to split certain atoms-this is called nuclear fission. When this happens, some matter gets destroyed, liberating huge amounts of energy. This energy mostly ends up as heat from which you can make steam to drive turbines and generators (referred to in sections above), and make electricity in power stations.

By careful design using material like uranium, engineers ensure that neutrons collide with uranium atoms, breaking them apart into unequal size halves. This yields energy and more neutrons and is called nuclear fission. Repeat this, and you have even more neutrons. If the uranium is the right type-uranium 235, a potent heat-releasing but controllable chain reaction starts up. This is what powers reactors.

Reactors use a low grade of U-235 which can not sustain the atomic bomb type reaction. This is why reactors contain tons of uranium, whereas a bomb needs only a few kilograms. Because reactor grade uranium, most of which is uranium 238 which is not fissile, contains only 1 to 2% U-235, neutrons have to be slowed or they simply bounce off other uranium atoms.

Engineers slow down the neutrons with a moderator which increases the likelihood of them smashing another U-235 atom to continue the reaction. The moderator can be graphite or ordinary water, designated pressurized Water reactors, PWRs, the most commonest reactor type around the world. In PWRs, the water slows the neutrons and also cools the core. Powerful pumps cycle the hot water out of the reactor core into enormous steam generators.

JURAGUA

As seen above, over the past 20 years Cuba has been faced with an ongoing energy crisis. Depending heavily upon imported oil, the Cuban government has attempted to seek an alternative to oil through nuclear energy. In cooperation with the former Soviet Union, Cuba embarked on a project to construct and operate a nuclear power plant in Cienfuegos, known as Juragua. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union halted construction at Juragua. Recent bilateral cooperation between Cuba and Russia has re-ignited the possibility of Juragua’s completion in the near future. The United States views a nuclear reactor in Cuba as a threat to its national security. The U.S. has cited numerous safety concerns associated with Juragua, believing in the event of an accident it would be exposed to radioactive fallout.

Description

In 1976 Cuba and the Soviet Union signed an agreement to construct two 440-megawatt nuclear power reactors in the south central province of Cienfuegos, near Juragua, about 180 south of Key West, Florida. Juragua’s nuclear reactors are of the model VVER-440, of Soviet design and are the first Soviet-designed reactors to be built in the Western Hemisphere in a tropical environment.

The arrangement was aimed at alleviating Cuba’s dependency upon foreign oil while bolstering its electricity capacity. The importation of oil has drained Cuba of its sparse hard currency. At the same time the country’s production of electricity has been fraught with difficulties. As of 1992 Cuban power plants have been working at only 47% of their capacity, leading to frequent blackouts. This figure has fallen further due to the relative decline in the Cuban economy since 1998. Upon completion, the first reactor, Juragua #1, would generate approximately 15% of Cuba’s energy demands.

Actual construction of the reactors began in 1983. The Soviet Union supplied a majority of the reactor parts, dispatched technicians to supervise construction, and trained Cuban engineers to operate the reactors. According to 1992 GAO report, Russia tentatively scheduled the first reactor to be operational in late 1995. This was due in part to the Cubans constructing the reactor lacking experience and with all critical work being performed by Russians or under their supervision.

However, the breakup of the Soviet Union disrupted construction at Juragua. The newly formed Russian Federation in conjunction with its transitioning into a market economy established new economic ties with Cuba. Current bilateral ties between Russia and Cuba, now, involve providing technical assistance to Cuba on a commercial basis. At the same time the loss of  Soviet subsidies to Cuba after 1990 has sent the Cuban economy into decline. As a result, on September 5, 1992, Cuba announced a suspension of construction at Juragua due to Cuba’s inability to meet the financial terms set by Russia to complete the reactors.

A September 1992 GAO report estimated that civil construction on the first reactor ranged from 90% to 97% complete with only 37% of the reactor equipment installed. About 25% of the civil construction on the second reactor was completed with the status of the equipment unknown.

Cuban-Russian attempts to resume construction at Juragua took place in October 1995. A high-level Russian delegation with full backing of the government arrived in La Habana to conclude an agreement to complete construction.  To raise the $ 800 million dollars necessary to complete the reactors, Russia and Cuba decided to form a syndicate with potential third parties. Companies in Britain, Brazil, italy, Germany, and Russia expressed interest in an economic association.

However, nothing concrete came out at that time. Cuba was rewarded with a $50 million dollar grant loan from Russia for support work at Juragua. Cuba now receives financial support for the Juragua plant from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The AIEA has provided nuclear technical assistance in atomic energy development and in the application of isotopes and radiation.

The AIEA has provided from 1991 to 1996 about $680,000 to Cuba to develop the ability to conduct a safety assessment of Juragua reactors, and in preserving or “mothballing”the reactors while construction is suspended. This assistance increased during 1997 to 1999. It is estimated that through the last 20 years the IAEA has provided Cuba with some $14 million dollars. We will dealt with this topic in a following section of the report.

Recent events have lead to the speculation of resumption of construction in the near future. Recently, July 2000, an official from the Russian Federation announced the intention to resume construction of Juragua. This will be accomplished through an international consortium of countries, including Russia. Upon resumption of construction, the Juragua first reactor is expected to be operational within a 14 month timespan.

Impact

In the event of an accident during Juragua’s operation radioactivity could leak from the plant. Such an accident would have a severely adverse effect upon Cuba, United States, Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. Once the reactors are operational, Cuba will have to develop plans to deal with nuclear waste generated by the reactors. Currently there are no appropriate sites to deposit nuclear waste in Cuba.
The Cuban government plans to dump waste in an area at sea level near the Juragua plant. This would contaminate flora, fauna and Cuban population.

Cuba’s attempt to establish a nuclear power plant has been met with substantial opposition in the United States and from environmental international agencies. Several experts indicate that the Juragua reactor is inundated with safety problems: structural defects in support structure in key reactor components, integral reactor systems, including the reactor vessels, steam generators and primary cooling pumps were exposed to highly corrosive tropical sea weather, poor training and experience level of the Cuban personnel who were trained on Soviet model  reactors which are different from Juragua,  and that as many as 10% of 5,000 approved welds in key reactor equipment were found to be defective.  Four similar Juragua type reactors (VVER-440) in East Germany were immediately shut down by West Germany upon reunification. Similar plants in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria were under inspection, shut down, or have received extensive modification. Refer to map of Eastern Europe.

The plant instrumentation and controls, for example, reactor protection systems and diagnostics are behind Western standards. The separation of the plant safety systems, to help assure that an event in one system will not interfere with operation of others, fire protection, and protection for control-room operators are below Western standards.

The reactors have poor leak-tightness of confinement. There is also an unknown quality of plant equipment and construction, due to lack of documentation on design, manufacturing and construction, and reported instances of poor quality materials being re-worked at plant sites. There are also major variations in operating and emergency procedures, operator training, and operational safety among plants using VVER-440.

The possibility of an accident occurring at Juragua, upon its operation, according to experts, is 15 times greater than the probabilities in a United States plant. Currently, Cuba lacks a comprehensive system to perform systematic readings that monitor radioactivity to prevent potential accidents. According to air weather patterns around Cienfuegos, it would take only 24 hours for radioactive materials to reach South Florida.

Meltdowns

How can radioactivity be released from a nuclear power plant? The only way that potentially large amounts of radioactivity could be released from a nuclear plant is by melting of the fuel in the reactor core. The fuel that is removed from a reactor after use and stored at the plant site also contains considerable amounts of radioactivity. To melt the fuel requires a failure in the cooling system or the occurrence of heat imbalance that would allow the fuel to heat up to its melting point, about 5000 degrees F.

It might seem that all that is required to prevent fuel from overheating is to promptly stop, or shut down, the fission process at the first sign of trouble. Although reactors have such fast shutdown systems, they alone are not enough since the radioactivity decay of fission fragments in the fuel continues to generate heat that must be removed even after the fission process stops. Therefore, reactors should have redundant decay heat removal systems. In addition, emergency core cooling systems should be provided to cope with a series of potential accidents, caused by ruptures in, and loss of coolant from, the normal cooling system.

There are two broad types of situations that might potentially lead to a melting of the reactor core: the loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and transients. In the event of a potential loss of coolant, the normal cooling water would be lost from the cooling systems and core melting would be prevented by the use of the emergency core cooling systems( ECCS). However, melting could occur in a loss of coolant if the ECCS were to fail to operate.
The term transient refers to any one of a number of conditions which could occur in a plant and would require the reactor to be shut down. Following shut down, the decay heat removal systems would operate to keep the core from overheating. Certain failures in either the shutdown or the decay heat removal systems also have the potential to cause melting of the core.

The water in the reactor cooling systems is at a very high pressure (between 50 to 100 times the pressure in a car tire) and if a rupture were to occur in the pipes, pumps, valves, or vessels that contain it, then a blowout would happen. The specific LOCA initiating events have been identified as:

A. Large pipe breaks
B. Small to intermediate pipe breaks
C. Small pipe breaks
D. Large disruptive reactor vessel ruptures
E. Gross steam generator ruptures
F. Ruptures between systems that interface with the cooling system
 

Studies have indicated that a core meltdown in a large reactor would likely lead to a failure of the containment. Therefore, the containment integrity is very important.

Fuel melting accidents release more than 200 different radioactive substances, of which, 54 are very dangerous. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC, which oversees the United States’ nuclear power plants, says exposure should not exceed 25 millirem per year, while the Environmental Protection Agency, EPA, has set a standard of 15 millirem, with ground water levels not to exceed 4 millirem.

Aroutine chest X-ray contains 6 millirem. Dosages above 30,000 millirem are known to cause cancer, and levels of 400,000 millirem can cause death in days. Another international unit used is the curie. For example, the nuclear accident at Chernobyl, the worst nuclear accident to date, spewing about 100 million Curies, or 4x10^18 becquerels, of radioactive material into the environment. By contrast, the Three Mile Island released only some 15 Curies.

Accidental Release of Radioactivity from Juragua

Radioactive pollutants released into the atmosphere will form a plume that can be transported and dispersed by air currents, thus reaching areas distant from the release location. It is therefore possible to construct maps of a plume impact, average time of arrival, and relative plume concentration from a single pollutant release, given the release location, meteorological data, a transport and dispersion model, and a statistical analysis program to determine useful and accurate results.

The release of radioactivity to the air from a nuclear power station accident differs in at least one way from that produced by nuclear tests. The radioactivity is injected near the ground and not at high altitude as with tests. The two scavenging mechanisms that physically remove the radioactivity from the air, namely, wet and dry fallout, are more effective when a radioactive cloud is near the ground rather than at high altitudes.

Meteorological data are routinely generated from the National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The NOAA, the Meteorological Center and the Air Resources Laboratory (ARL) have conducted experimental data on air emanating from Cienfuegos, in one complete year. The geographic domain in the analysis for a Cienfuegos release was a grid (95 km. Spacing) including all of the U.S., Mexico, the western Atlantic, Gulf of Mexico, and the Caribbean sea.

A release was assumed every 6 hours for the month, with the transport following each release continuing for a duration of 5 days. This duration was chosen so all plumes would approach or cross the geographic domain boundaries. Simplified graphs and maps are presented in the next page.

The main feature of the probabilities is that shows relatively higher values to the west and northwest of Cienfuegos. Relative concentrations at Miami, Fl., and Houston, Texas are about the same during the Summer. However, Miami and Tallahassee, Fl. show very high probability of impact during the winter. Average time of plume arrival, as well as earliest time of plume arrival show Miami with the highest in all seasons. Central America, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Caribbean, show very high probabilities of impact as Tallahassee and Houston. The average time it would take for radioactivity from Cienfuegos to reach southern Florida is 48 hours. The shortest time would be less than 24 hours.

VVER-440 reactors

A VVER-440 reactor is a pressurized water reactor developed from a reactor design based on the first nuclear submarine reactors in the Soviet Union, where de-mineralized light water is applied as both cooling agent and for moderating the neutrons. The first version, VVER-440/230, was developed in the 60’s, while the VVER-440/213 was introduced in the 80’s. It is a Russian version of the Pressurized Water reactor (PWR). There are three standard designs-two 6 loop-440 megawatt(the 230 and 213 models), and 4 loop-1000megawatt output designs. Re-fuelings are conducted with the plant shutdown.

The reactor core in a VVER-440 reactor is 3 meters in diameter, has a height of 2.5 meters, and is enclosed by a cylindrical pressure receptacle of steel, of a diameter of 4.3 meters and a height of 11.8 meters. The total weight is 200 tons. The reactor core contains 312 fuel assemblies and 37 control assemblies. Each fuel assembly consists of 126 fuel pins, which in turn consists of uranium-dioxide pellets. The content of 235U in the fuel is replaced by new, non-irradiated fuel assemblies. The temperature of the cooling water as it leaves the reactor is between 295 and 300 degrees Celsius.

Each reactor coolant loop includes a steam generator and a reactor coolant pump. The water passes through the inside of the tubes in the steam generator. The reactor coolant pump circulates the water for cooling the reactor core. The system is pressurized to 2200+ pounds per square inch by a pressurizer, which is connected to one of the reactor coolant loops. Refer to schematics.

In the third schematic (model 230), the numbers indicate:

1. Reactor
2. Steam Generator
3. Main Circulation Pump
4. Refueling Machine
5. Cooling pond
6. Deaerator
7. Steam Turbine
8. Generator
9. Steam Pipelines
10. Cooling Water Pipelines
11. Transformer

In the fourth schematic (model 213), the numbers indicate:

1. Reactor pressure vessel
2. Steam generator
3. Refueling machine
4. Spent fuel pit
5. Confinement system
6. Make-up feedwater system
7. Protective cover
8. Confinement system
9. Sparging system
10. Check valves
11. Intake air unit
12. Turbine
13. Condenser
14. Turbine block
15. Feedwater tank with degasifier
16. Preheater
17. Turbine hall crane
18. Electrical instrumentation and control compartments

A major difference between western designed PWRs and the VVERs is that the latter have horizontal steam generators. The older VVERs have isolation valves in the reactor coolant loops and accident localization compartments. Water passing on the outside of the steam generator tubes is heated and converted to steam. Steam in the VVER design is not expected to be radioactive. The VVER 440 design includes accident localization zones and a confinement rather than a true containment.

The VVER-440 in Juragua belong to the “second generation” of the VVER family. However, they do not meet western standards. They also have an inadequacy of the upper portion of the reactor’s dome retention capability to withstand only 7 pounds of pressure per square inch, given that normal atmospheric pressure is 32 pounds per square inch and United States reactors are designed to accommodate pressures of 50 pounds per square inch. Normal air pressure at sea level, the level at which the plant is being constructed, is 14.7 pounds per square inch. Therefore, the dome cannot survive when exposed to the atmosphere.

The design of the Cuban reactor has many features in common with those of the U.S., but there are several differences that could lead to significantly different reactions in the event of a serious accident. For example, while the Cuban reactor, like the U.S. PWRs, use water to cool the reactor core, the Cuban reactor uses a different system for handling the steam pressure that would be generated by a severe accident.

 In the Cuban reactor, the steam is condensed so that pressure is reduced in the containment structure. If, in the case of a severe accident, the system for condensing the steam is bypassed and the steam reaches the upper portion of the containment in pressures greater than the upper portion’s designed pressure retention capability of 7 pounds per square inch. The containment could be breached and a radioactive release could occur. In contrast, U.S. PWRs are designed to accommodate pressures of about 50 pounds per square inch throughout the containment structure.

Another main difference between the VVER-440 reactors and reactors of Western type is the degree of safety containment surrounding the reactor tank of the VVER-440.The airtight safety containment of Western power plant encloses the reactor tank, the primary-and secondary circuits, as well as the steam generators. At a possible leakage, the safety containments will see that the radioactive steam does not escape to the surroundings. At Western reactors, this safety containment is made of prestressed concrete.

Also, there are devices for cooling the steam to decrease the pressure. The construction surrounding the reactor systems of the VVER-440 has a volume too small to relieve the pressure arising should a breach occur in pipes of more than 32 mm in diameter. The construction is fitted with valves, which are released if the pressure gets too high.

Integral reactor systems, including the reactor vessel itself, six steam generators, five primary coolant pumps, twelve isolation valves and more, were stored outside for months, exposed to the highly corrosive tropical sea air and weather. No nuclear reactor of Soviet design has ever been constructed in a tropical climate.

The group of the world’s seven richest countries (G7) has concluded that all reactors of the VVER-440 type must be shut down as soon possible, as the reactors are upgraded to Western safety standards. Even the World Bank emphasizes the serious defects of reactors of this type, rendering any reconstruction unprofitable. From an economical point of view, the World Bank claims nuclear power plant with reactors of the VVER-440 type to be the most expensive energy alternative for the years to come.

There are eight VVER-440 reactors in operation in former Eastern Europe and Russia. These are localized in Bulgaria, Slovakia, Russia. 6 additional reactors of this type have formerly been in operation in, but are now shut down. Four reactors were in operation at the nuclear power plant of Greifswald in former DDR. The reactors were dismantled by the German authorities after the reunion due to the lack of security at this type of reactor. There are two reactors in Armenia, but they are temporarily shut down due to their poor state.

On the construction side, the VVER-440 reactors deviate from safety standards of Western reactors. IEAA performed in 1991 a safety analysis of the 10 reactors in operation, and found 100 safety aspects connected to the design and the operation of the plants. More than 60% of these aspects are of great importance when safety is concerned.

The main problems concerning the design of the reactor type is as following:

 
· Deficiencies in the construction concerning the limitation of discharges to the surroundings in case of breaches in pipes of more than 32 mm in the primary circuit
· Lack of safety containment surrounding the core
· Limited capacity of the cooling system
· Unsufficient “backup” of the cooling system and safety system
· Lack of distinction between control systems and safety precautions concerning fire
· Obsolete control room technology

Neutron irradiation of the reactor tank, causing the steel to become brittle, is a vital safety issue of the VVER-440 reactors. The proximity of the fuel assemblies to the steel walls in the VVER-440 reactor tank, causes higher neutron irradiation than in other types of reactors, and the walls to become brittle at a higher pace than normal. The VVER-440 reactor tank is made up of welded rings. The welded seams are particularly exposed to neutron irradiation. As a remedy, in some designs during the late 80’s, the outermost assemblies were replaced with steel rods.

Light-water reactors are considered safer than the graphite-cooled model that was in use in Chernobyl, Ukraine, site of the world’s worst nuclear accident. But the Russian-designed VVER-440 light water reactors do not meet the safety standards of Western nations. The design is considered unsafe and should not be in operation.
 

International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA)

Since 1958, the IAEA, in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, has been providing nuclear technical assistance to its member states through projects that supply equipment, expert services, and training. Currently, more than 90 countries receive nuclear technical assistance, mostly through over 1,000 projects in IAEA’s technical cooperation program.

The United States is a member of IAEA and its major financial contributor.  IAEA is providing nuclear technical assistance to Cuba in 10 program areas, including general atomic energy development, the application of isotopes and radiation in medicine, agriculture, and nuclear safety. Most of the assistance, however, has been for Cuba’s partially constructed nuclear power reactors.

IAEA spent about $12 million on nuclear assistance projects for Cuba since 1963 through 1996. About 75% of the assistance Cuba received through these projects consisted of equipment, radiation related instruments, and laboratory equipment. The rest was in the area of general atomic energy development. IAEA recently approved an additional $1.7 million for nuclear technical assistance projects for Cuba for 1997  through 1999.

In addition, IAEA spent about $2.8 million on training Cuban nationals and research contracts for Cuba. The United States contributes about 40% of the total funds of the agency for such projects. IAEA is assisting Cuba in developing the ability to conduct assessments of the nuclear power reactors and in preserving or “mothballing” the reactors while construction is suspended.

Nuclear Waste Disposal

The disposal of radioactive waste from nuclear power plants is a very serious problem. Nuclear waste can be generally classified as either low level radioactive waste or high level radioactive waste. Low level nuclear waste usually includes material used to handle the highly radioactive parts of nuclear reactors, like cooling water pipes and radiation suits, and waste from medical procedures involving radioactive materials. Low level waste is comparatively easy to dispose of.

High level radioactive waste is generally material from the core of the nuclear reactor. Most of the radioactive isotopes in high level waste emit large amounts of radiation and have extremely long half-lives, some larger than 100,000 years, creating long time periods before the waste will settle to safe levels of radioactivity. Radioactive wastes, being highly toxic, can destroy or damage living cells, causing cancer and possibly death depending on the quantity and length of exposure. In addition, radioactive material can be mutagenic, thereby transmitting biological damage into the future.

Every 12-24 months the reactor of a nuclear power plant is shut down and the oldest fuel assemblies, which have released their energy but have become intensely radioactive as a result of fission, are removed and replaced. The fuel which has been consumed is known as “spent” nuclear fuel, SNF. Spent nuclear fuel can be dissolved in a chemical process called “reprocessing”, which is used to recover desired radionuclides.

If SNF is not reprocessed prior to disposal, it becomes the waste form without further modification. The only commercial reprocessing facility to operate in the United States closed in 1972. Since that time, no commercial SNF has been reprocessed in the United States. Where are the wastes stored now?

Today, most SNF is stored in water pools or above-ground in dry concrete or steel canisters at more than 70 commercial nuclear-power reactor sites across the nation. Also, waste is stored underground in steel tanks at four Federal facilities in Idaho, Washington, South Carolina, and New York. Plans are to store SNF at Yucca Mountain repository in Nevada.

All high level radioactive waste must end its journey in long term storage. The waste must not be allowed to escape to the outside environment by any foreseeable accident, malevolent action, or geological activity. This includes accidental uncovering, removal by groups intending to use the radioactive material in a harmful manner, leeching of the waste into the water supply, and exposure from geological movement activity.

The extreme lethality of a freshly removed spent fuel bundle is such that a person standing within a meter of it would die within an hour. The hazards associated with transportation, in particular the possibility of accidents, are very serious. Therefore, the minimization of handling and transporting spent fuel is a desirable objective.

Areas currently being evaluated for storage of nuclear waste are space, under the sea bed, and large stable geologic formations on land.  Long term storage on land seems to be the favorite of most countries. Cuba has not serious plans at this point for the proper disposal of nuclear waste, neither is technical or economical prepared to dispose safely of the nuclear waste.

Caribbean Early Warning System (CREWS)

The components of the CREWS regional monitoring system are comprised of field sensors, a central data analysis facility, a central measurement facility, and a meteorological support group. The backbone of the system is a network of airborne radioactivity monitoring stations that are capable of meeting the early warning and high sensitivity objectives of the mission. The primary functions are:

· Field sensors: Semi automatic sensors will collect, assay, and transmit raw data.
· Central Data Analysis Facility: This facility houses the processing and analysis capability to monitor the data from the field sensors.
· Central Measurement Facility: This facility is capable of achieving detection sensitivities of the order of micro becquerels per cubic meter.
· Meteorological Support Group: A link will be created with an existing facility to provide meteorological support in the event of a significant release of radioactivity.

Conclusions

1. Three of the VVER projects started by the former Soviet Union during the late 70’s and early 80’s encountered serious problems that led to their suspension. Of these three, two found solutions to their problems through the technical and financial help of other countries. Only Juragua remains uncompleted

2. The Cuban government is actively seeking financial and technical assistance to finish Juragua.  Feasibility studies indicate that $400 million dollars are needed to finish the first reactor. Once construction is resumed, a 14 month time span will be needed to make operational the reactor.

3. The civil construction of the first reactor is 97% complete. Approximately 40% of the reactor equipment is installed.

4. In the event of an accident during Juragua’s operation, radioactivity could leak from the plant with an adverse effect upon Cuba, United States, Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean.

5. The release of radioactive to the air from a nuclear plant is more effective than the one produced from nuclear tests. Meteorological data conducted by the National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration, NOAA, and the Air Resources Laboratory, ARL, show an early arrival of radioactivity to Florida of less than 24 hours. The average time of arrival would be 48 hours. In 72 hours,  areas affected will be Central America, Mexico, the Caribbean, and most of the U.S. Eastern Seaboard.

6. The cities with a major impact in the U.S. will be Miami, Florida; Houston, Texas, and Tallahassee, Florida.

7. The main  problems concerning safety related to the Juragua’s reactor are:

· Deficiencies in the construction concerning the limitation of discharges to the surroundings in case of breaches in pipes of more than 32 mm in the primary circuit.
· Lack of safety containment surrounding the core
· Limited capacity of the cooling system
· Insufficient backup of the cooling system and safety system
· Lack of distinction between control systems and safety precautions concerning fire
· Obsolete control room technology
· Neutron irradiation of the reactor tank could cause the steel to brittle
· Reactor dome has a retention capability to withstand only 7 pounds of pressure per square inch. Standard in the U.S. is 50 pounds per square inch
· Unknown quality of plant equipment and construction
· Lack of documentation on design, manufacturing and construction
· Reported instances of poor quality materials being re-worked at plant site.
· Reactor protection systems and diagnostic behind Western standards
· Separation of the plant safety systems, and protection for control room operators are below Western standards

8. The possibility of an accident occurring at Juragua, upon its operation, is estimated to be 15 times greater than the probabilities in a United States plant.

9. Cuba lacks a comprehensive system to perform systematic readings that monitor radioactivity to prevent potential accidents.

10. Six similar reactors of the Juragua type operating in Eastern Europe were shut down due to the lack of security of the reactors.

11. The IEAA performed in 1991 a safety analysis of the 10 reactors similar to the Juragua’s, remaining in operation, and found 100 safety aspects  connected to the design and the operation of the plants. More than 60% of these aspects are of great importance, and are not acceptable by Western standards.

12. The group of the world’s seven richest countries (G7) has concluded that all reactors of the VVER-440 type must be shut down as soon as possible, and the reactors should be upgraded to Western safety standards. The World Bank emphasizes the serious defects of the reactors of this type, rendering any reconstruction unprofitable.

13. Integral reactor systems-including the reactor vessel itself, six steam generators, five primary coolant pumps, twelve isolation valves and more-were stored outside for months, exposed to the highly corrosive tropical sea air and weather. Also, no nuclear reactor of Soviet design has ever been constructed in a tropical climate.

14. Cuba has not serious plans at this point for the proper disposal of the nuclear waste generated in Juragua, once in operation. Cuba is not technically or economically prepared to dispose safely of the nuclear waste

The Juragua nuclear plant should not be permitted to start operation under the present design and construction deficiencies.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Publications of the Center for Security Policy, No. 92-D-41

2. Report by U.S. Council of Energy Awareness: “The VVER design is very different from Western counterparts, and does not meet Western safety standards”, April, 1992

3. Nuclear Energy Information Center, “Source Book on Soviet Designed Nuclear power Plants”, 1996

4. The Natural Resources Defense Council, “Backgrounders: The Juragua Nuclear Plant”, 1997

5. Fisher-Thompson, Jim, “Recent Film Reveals Flaws of Cuban Nuclear Plant” U.S. Information Agency, August, 1995

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22. Report DOE/EIA-0219, April 1999

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25. Report # DOE/EIA-0383, December 1999

26. Inventory of Electric Utility Power Plants in the United States 1999 Executive Summary, EIA/DOE, 1999

27. TED Case Studies #469, August 1999

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30. Boletin Tecnico, Vol. III, No. 1-2, Centro de Informacion Cientifico Tecnica, Cuba, 1990

31. Personal conversations of the author with numerous Cuban engineers, scientists, technicians, workers, and government officials, 1988-2000.